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1 Introduction
The idea of considering a firm as an opportunity through which a group of diﬀerent indi-
viduals can actively learn how to organize the production of a given commodity is certainly
not new. Sometimes working together is just a technical necessity but more often it is also
a crucial prerequisite to eﬀectively develop the knowledge and the coordination necessary to
obtain a more than ordinary result in production. The learning process usually requires a
certain amount of time, e.g., if the firm starts producing at time 1, after a certain period, at
time 2, each worker has learned how to organize the production. As a consequence, at time 2
the firm can generate a surplus, equal to the diﬀerence between the money value of the firm’s
production and the market prices of the factors. However, under complete information, the
market for labour should reflect the value of such a surplus. Indeed, if a worker was to depart
from the firm, he could use his knowledge to set up a rival firm in the market.
This is particularly the case in modern high-tech industries, where innovative ideas can hardly
be protected at the development stage, and where therefore companies’ scientists, engineers
and CEOs can at times find convenient to move to a rival firm or set independent ven-
tures.1 In fact, although formally companies are not completely vulnerable to the disclosure
of their trade-secrets or their intellectual property rights, in reality Trade Secret Acts (like
the Uniform TSA in U.S.), corporate policies on trade secrets as well as postemployment
restrictive covenants, such as non disclosure and nonsolicitation agreements, are often vio-
lated.2 Moreover, when a key-employee sets up a new venture based on her organizational
and market experience, companies do not really have grounds for a good lawsuit. It can be
diﬃcult to achieve evidence from which a court can infer that either customer lists, pricing
and marketing plans or simply the company organizational style have been stolen.3
The idea that a worker can abandon the firm to setup a new venture dates back at least a
few centuries. In a well known passage of theWealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith describes
the causes of prosperity of new American colonies as a continuous process of transformation
of initially subordinate workers into a group of independent producers: ”The colonists carry
out a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful arts....”; ”Every colonist gets more land
1The most well known cases of this occurrence are reported for the high-tech district of Silicon Valley, with
its extremely high rate of turnover and spontaneous spin-oﬀs of highly skilled personnel (Carnoy et al. 1997,
Saxenian 1994, Hyde 2000, Gilson 2000).
2See, for instance, for a discussion about the problematic enforceability of trade secrets law, Cheung (1982)
and Fisk (2001).
3See Levin (1997) for a legal analysis of trade secrets and Besen and Raskind (1991) for the legal protection
of property rights.
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than he can possibly cultivate... He is eager, therefore, to collect labourers from all quarters,
and to reward them with the most liberal wages. But those liberal wages, joined to the plenty
and cheapness of the land, soon make those labourers leave him, in order to become landlords
themselves, and to reward, with equal liberality, other labourers, who soon leave them for the
same reason ....” (book IV, part II, ch. VII).
The repeated and recursive process of formation of new production units appears as an
important feature of a setup dealing with the issue of workers’ eﬀective outside option. Re-
cently, there have mainly been two related issues which have attracted the attention of the
economic literature. The first concerns the eﬀects of the potential exit of the workers both on
the level and distribution of earnings within the firm and on its internal organisation.4 These
contributions recognize in diﬀerent ways the possibility that wages, hierarchies and contrac-
tual relations between the firm and the workers can be shaped by the potential competitive
threat of employees’ departure from the firm with relevant information. However, none of
these works model explicitly the potential recursive eﬀect of information transmission and
new firms formation via the repeated workers’ departure from their company. Moreover, the
role of market demand for a given product is not the main focus of these works.
A second important recent stream of literature mainly look instead at the issue of internal
competition within innovative firms and the threat of information leakage at the developing
stage of an innovation, when there are no eﬀective intellectual property rights protecting
inventors.5
Again, the dynamic eﬀect of increasing competition is usually not the main focus of these
papers, with the exception of Anton and Yao (1994) and Baccara and Razin (2004). Both
these papers consider the threat of competition as a deterrence of information leakage and
idea stealing. The first paper considers the problem of information leakage for an independent
inventor sharing his project with a manufacturer. The inventor can protect his innovation and
gain some rents by credibly threatening to reveal the idea to another competitor. However,
the fact that the idea can also be stolen from the new competitor is not considered in the
paper. In Baccara and Razin (2004) the sequence of information spillover among agents is
directly modelled through a sequential bargaining process between informed and uninformed
agents. Even so, this paper does not deal explicitly with the interaction between market
demand for the product, matching technology and the length of the time horizon.
4See, among the others, Nitzan and Pakes (1982), MacLeod andMalcomson (1988), Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990), Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1997), Wolinsky (2000), Rajan and Zingales (2001) and Zabojnik (2002).
5See, Arrow (1962), Nitzan and Pakes (1982), Feinstein and Stein (1988), Anton and Yao (1994), Cooper
(2001) Perotti (2004) and Baccara and Razin (2004)).
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Our paper proposes a very simple multi-stage game of knowledge transmission among
agents across firms, via workers’ mobility. Our setup assumes that initially only one agent
possesses a new idea. However, to realize it commercially she needs to recruit at least another
agent in the pool of existing agents, currently uninformed about the idea. This simple con-
straint is meant to capture the fact that usually for an inventor or a person with an innovative
project it is extremely diﬃcult to accomplish her project without the collaboration of people
with diﬀerent skills.6 Even if there are no substantial setup costs to start the business, for the
inventor the need to share the idea with another person does not come for free: once involved
in the project and before the actual production takes place, previously uninformed workers
becomes informed and potentially ready to start a new venture to develop commercially the
idea, again in collaboration with another (uninformed) agent. This spillover eﬀect - in ab-
sence of well established intellectual property rights on new ideas - generates a recursive eﬀect
of knowledge transmission, aﬀecting simultaneously the players’ payoﬀs and the number of
active players engaged in market competition. The fact that the learning process occurs both
without cost and before the production process arises, is a crucial assumption of the model.
If knowledge transmission would occur after the actual production of the innovative good,
the inventor could pay her collaborator just his reservation wage, letting him go and then
start again training (without cost) another uninformed worker. Given our assumptions, we
can focus instead on the possibility that informed individuals either deter the exit of their
collaborators by paying an ”exit proof” wage, or favour their exit, thus voluntarily expanding
the number of players involved and, hence, the market structure for the innovative product.
If exit-deterrence takes place, we assume that the game ends and payoﬀs are assigned to both
informed and uninformed players. This specific feature of the game is not relevant for its
results. Even allowing the game to continue in all subsequent periods after deterrence has
occurred, the game outcome would not change. The relevant trade oﬀ between exit deter-
rence and exit accommodation would remain, with the only diﬀerence that deterrence would
continue for all remaining periods of the game.
We provide suﬃcient conditions for the game to possess a unique symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which incumbent players deter the exit of their collaborators. The
equilibrium outcome is shown to mainly depend upon the success of the idea over time (i.e.
its commercial acceptability), as expressed by the behaviour of the market demand, and
on players’ time preferences. A few other intuitions are provided on the interplay between
6It is widely recognized that the commercial development of a new idea is usually a process which relies
crucially on the interaction between many diﬀerent individuals [see Callon (1989), Dodgson (1993) and Perotti
(2003)].
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technology, market structure and the value of an innovative idea. The paper is organized
as follows. The next section presents the game. Section 3 is devoted to illustrate the main
results of the paper. Section 4 applies the results to some simple examples. Finally, section
5 concludes the paper.
2 The Game
The purpose of this section is to introduce a very simple model of transmission of an in-
novative idea between agents within firms. We assume that initially (period 1) only one
agent (the innovator) possesses an idea on how to produce a new good. However, for the
actual production to take place, she has to recruit an uninformed player, spend one period
explaining him the project, oﬀer him a wage and, if the player accepts, sell the commodity
at the end of the period. The wage the innovator has to oﬀer cannot simply be equal to the
prevailing reservation wage. In fact, at period 2 the newly informed player is potentially able
to leave the firm, recruiting another uninformed player and sell the commodity for his profit.
However, the new producer is subject to the same exit threat from his worker, and similarly
for all other subsequent leaving workers, until the market capacity, assumed given, cannot
accommodate anymore competitors.
To translate the above problem in the most elementary fashion, let us introduce a multi-
stage game (t = 1, ...T ) with observed actions and with a set of players N = {1, 2, .., i, ...}
corresponding to the set of natural numbers.7 We denote by It ⊂ N the subset of players
fully informed about the new idea at time t; at time 1 only one of them is in I1, i.e. disposes
of a given knowledge (e.g. an innovative idea) on how to produce a given output y. We
introduce simple assumptions on technology, market demand and knowledge transmission
within each production unit.
Assumption 1 (Leontief production technology) For every t = 1, 2, ...T , yt = min
©
It, N\Itª
and no setup costs.
Assumption 2 (Inverse demand function) P (Y t) : <+ → <+ twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, with Y t =
P
i∈It y
t
i , P (0) > 0, P
0(Y t) < 0 for all P (Y t) > 0 and P (Y t) log-concave
for P (Y t) > 0.
7This allows to rule out any increase of wages as due to shortage of workforce.
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Assumption 3 (Knowledge transmission) At each time t, every player j ∈ N\It recruited
by a player i ∈ It acquires the full knowledge on how to produce yt before the actual production
takes place.
Assumption 1 implies that any period of the game each informed player has to engage
an uninformed player to produce the commodity. This constraint causes the transmission of
knowledge within each production unit. The Leontief technology is the simplest and most
extreme example of complementarity between an innovator (or an informed player) and an
(unskilled) uninformed agents required to produce and commercialize an innovative product.
Since the inclusion of setup costs - in absence of credit constraints - would not change the
results of the model, we simply assume zero setup costs. Assumption 2 stipulates a standard
downward sloping demand function starting from a point on the price axis and touching
the quantity axis for a finite value of Y t. We adopt here a partial equilibrium approach,
excluding the possible (positive) feedback of the new entrants on the market demand for the
new product. The implicit assumption is that either all active players do not consume the
innovative good or their consumption does not have any impact on P (Y t). Log-concavity of
P (Y t) is a crucial assumption for the characterization of a SNE of the game.8 Its economic
meaning is that the expansion of the market (due to the entry of new firms) reduces the
commercial value of the idea more when there are many (with a large Y t) rather than few
competitors (with a small Y t). We postpone to the following sections a detailed discussion
of the eﬀect of the shape of market demand on the equilibrium of the game. Assumption
3 concerns the transmission of knowledge and, coupled with assumption 1 implies that if
at time (t − 1) the wage oﬀers does not satisfy the recruited agents and they leave their
firms, at time t the number of competing firms becomes kt = 2(t−1), each producing one unit
of output (so also Y t = 2(t−1)) and involving two players, one informed and one becoming
informed at the end of the period.9 By assumptions 1-3 it also follows that informed players
will surely stop recruiting workers for P (Y t) = 0, when proceeding further would make all
players’ payoﬀs lower than their reservation utility.
We can now describe the structure of the game. Every period of the game t = 1, ...T
includes two stages, the first in which all informed agent play and the second in which is the
turn of the uninformed ones. An action ati for an informed player i ∈ It at period t can be
defined as a wage oﬀer wti ∈ W ⊂ <+ to a recruited player j ∈ N\It which, if accepted, is
8When smooth, P (Y ) is log-concave if and only if P 00P − (P 0)2 ≤ 0. It can be seen that this is a weaker
assumption than concavity of P (Y t).
9The game can easily be extended (without qualitative changes) to the case of m initial informed players.
In this case, the number of firms composed of two players would be, at each stage t, m(t−1).
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assumed to directly imply the production of one unit of yt according to the given technology.
An action atj for an uninformed player j ∈ N\It at stage t (once recruited by an informed
player) is a decision whether to accept the oﬀered wage and jointly produce the good or reject
it and leave as a newly informed player. Formally, atj ∈ {yes, no} for every j ∈ N\It. Thus,
the game is a sequence of periods in which all informed players simultaneously oﬀer wages
to recruited workers and, if the latter accept, production takes place and the game ends. If
they reject the oﬀer, the game proceeds from t to (t+1) and the number of informed players
(and of potentially competing firms) duplicate (from 2(t−1) to 2t).
Formally, a history of the game Ht = (a1, a2, ..., at−1) is a sequence of action profiles
ah = (ah1 , a
h
2 , ..., a
h
n) for h = 1, ..t before stage t. Each player’s payoﬀ can be represented as
a function ui : H
T+1 → R, where HT+1 is the terminal history of the game. Specifically, in
our game we assume linear utility functions and common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) for all
players. So, if the game terminates at time t, uti = δtπti = δt
£
P (Y t)− wti
¤
for all i ∈ It, and
utj = δtwti , for all recruited j ∈ N\It. For all inactive players we assume uti = 0.10
The concept of equilibrium used to solve the game is a standard symmetric subgame
perfect equilibria (SNE) in pure strategies.
3 Main Results
It is easy to see that the model described above possesses a recursive nature. Consider, for
instance, the potential payoﬀ of the only informed player at t = 1. Since inaction implies
zero payoﬀ, player i ∈ I1 has an incentive to oﬀer a wage w1 to a player in N\I1 which, if
accepted, implies the production of one unit of y, so y1 = 1, with payoﬀ
u1i = δπ1 = δ
h
P (Y 1)− w1
i
, (1)
where, according to the Leontief technology, Y 1 = 21−1 = 1. However, if the informed player
wants to prevent the exit of her worker before production occurs, she has to ensure him at
least what he could gain at the end of the following period, that is:
w1 = δ2π2 = δ2
h
P (Y 2)−w2
i
. (2)
where Y 2 = 2(2−1) = 2 and
w2 = δ3
h
P (Y 3)−w3
i
, (3)
10By the symmetry between every informed and every uninformed player, respectively, we will drop the
index from their payoﬀs: π = πi for every i ∈ It and w = wj for every j ∈ N\It.
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with Y 3 = 2(3−1) = 4, and so on, until time T is reached. Therefore, it is obvious that an
informed player i ∈ It has an incentive to deter the exit of her worker only if δtπt ≥ δt+mπt+m,
for m = 1, ...(T − t), i.e. if:
δt
h
P (Y t)− wt
i
≥ δt+m
h
P (Y t+m)− wt+m
i
(4)
or
δtP (Y t)− δt+mP (Y t+m) ≥ δtwt − δt+mwt+m. (5)
The economic meaning of expression (5) is that an informed player will find convenient to pay
an ”exit-proof ” wage to her worker only if the expected loss in revenue (due to the fact that
P 0(Y t) < 0 and Y t grows over periods) is bigger than the expected saving in term of wage,
given that time and increasing competition reduce both. However, the right-hand side of
expression (5) includes terms which, in turn, potentially depend on all future histories of the
game. In particular, it is possible to represent the payoﬀs of both informed and uninformed
players in the event that all present and future informed players want to prevent the exit of
their employees and the latter decide to accept the oﬀer. These are:
u1i =
TX
t=1
tY
h=1
δhP (2t−1)(−1)(t−1), (6)
for i ∈ I1
u1j = w
1 = δ2π2 =
TX
t=2
tY
h=2
δhP (2t−1)(−1)(t−1), (7)
for the enrolled worker j ∈ N\I1.
Similarly, if the game ends at a generic period et, expression (6) becomes:
ueti = δetπet = TX
t=et
tY
h=et δ
h(P (2t−1))(−1)(t−et), (8)
and each active worker’s payoﬀ at time et is just equal to:
uetj = wet = δet+1πet+1 = TX
t=et+1
tY
h=et+1 δ
h(P (2t−1))(−1)(t−et+1). (9)
Let us describe now the full conditions required for the game to terminate at time t. The
game ends at time t only if the following condition holds:
δtπt ≥ δt+mπt+m (10)
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for all m = 1, ..., T − t, where,
wt ≥ δt+mπt+m. (11)
for all m = 1, ..., (T − t). Conditions (10) and (11) guarantee that at an arbitrary period
t for both an informed player and her worker, there is no incentive to change action and
continue the game.11
The next lemma shows some of the properties of the recursive payoﬀ (8), which, as said
before, assumes as specific history that at all periods every informed player oﬀers an exit-
deterrence wage to the worker, and this accepts it.
The lemma ensures that at each time t, for both informed and uninformed players, the
payoﬀs (8) and (9) are positive. This ensures that at every stage for each i ∈ It is more
convenient to hire an uninformed player and paying him an exit-proof wage rather than
staying inactive (when ui = 0), and for every j ∈ N\It is more convenient to accept such a
wage than being inactive.
Lemma 1 When an exit-deterrence wage is oﬀered and accepted at every t = 1, 2...T , time
t players’ payoﬀs (8) and (9) are non negative.
Proof. As a start suppose that both t and T are even. Hence,
ueti = TX
t=et
tY
h=et δ
h(P (2(t−1))(−1)(t−et) = (12)
= δet hP (2et−1)− δet+1P (2et)i+ δetδet+1δet+2 hP (2et+1)− δet+3P (2et+2)i+
+....+ δetδet+1 · · · δT−2 hP (2T−2)− δT−1P (2T−1)i .
By assumptions 1-2, P (Y t) is decreasing in t and, as a consequence, expression (12) is positive.
It easy to see that the same holds for et even and T odd, et odd and T even and for the case
in which they are both odd. The same occurs for each recruited worker’s payoﬀs, given that
uetj = uet+1i for all j ∈ N\It.
We are now ready to provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a SNE of the
game with complete exit deterrence. In doing this, the main purpose is to gain a better
understanding of the processes at work in the model. In particular, the result below sheds
some light on the reasons why at the equilibrium the endogenous market structure is a
monopoly or any other market form.
11Note that each player, once informed, can move from a period to the next by just paying her worker a
wage wt < πt+1
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Proposition 1 For δ ≤ [P (Y
2)2+P (Y 1)4P (Y 2)]
1
2−P (Y 2)
2P (Y 2) , the game ends at time t = 1 and the
only symmetric SNE of the game is the strategy profile in which at every stage t = 1, ...T ,
informed players propose a deterrence wage as in (9) and every worker accepts it.
Proof. Since the demand intersects the quantity axis for a finite quantity, we denote as T
the final period of the game, such that P (Y T ) ≤ 0. Reasoning backward, at stage (T − 1)
every informed player willing to keep her trained worker inside the firm has to oﬀer a wage
wT−1 = δTP (Y T ) = 0, and play {accept} will be a weakly dominant action for each worker.
Therefore, every informed proposer will find optimal to oﬀer this (reservation) wage obtaining
δT−1πT−1 = δT−1
h
P (Y T−1)
i
. In turn, at stage (T − 2), each informed player will have an
incentive to prevent the exit of her workers only if:
δT−2πT−2 ≥ δT−1πT−1 (13)
that is
δ(T−2)
h
P (Y T−2)− wT−2
i
≥ δ(T−1)P (Y T−1),
which can be written as
δ(T−2)
h
P (Y T−2)− δ(T−1)P (Y T−1)
i
≥ δ(T−1)P (Y T−1), (14)
i.e.,
δ(T−2)P (Y T−2) ≥ δ(T−1)P (Y T−1)(1 + δ(T−2))
which can be simplified as
P (Y T−2)
P (Y T−1)
≥
³
δT−1 + δ2T−3
´
δ(T−2)
= δ + δT−1. (15)
The same procedure can be repeated at every period t. If all informed players will prevent
the exit of their co-workers at all following stages, the condition for the game to be a SNE
with deterrence at stage t is:
δtπt ≥ δt+1πt+1 ≥ ... ≥ δT−1πT−1 (16)
with
wt = δt+1πt+1, (17)
wt+1 = δt+2πt+2,
.....
wT−1 = δTπT .
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Let us consider just the first inequality in (16), δtπt ≥ δt+1πt+1; using (8), (9) and (17), for
T and t both even, we obtain
δtP (Y t)− δtδt+1P (Y t+1) + δtδt+1δt+2P (Y t+2)− ..− δtδt+1δt+2..δT−1P (Y T−1)
≥ δt+1P (Y t+1)− δt+1δt+2P (Y t+2) + .....+ δt+1δt+2..δT−1P (Y T−1)
or
δtP (Y t)− (1 + δt)δt+1P (Y t+1) +
+(1 + δt)
h
δt+1δt+2P (Y t+2)− δt+1δt+2δt+3P (Y t+3)
i
+
+(1 + δt)
h
δt+1δt+2δt+3δt+4P (Y t+4)− δt+1δt+2δt+3δt+4P (Y t+5)
i
+ ....+
+(1 + δt)
h
δt+1δt+2δt+3δt+4 · ·δT−2P (Y T−2)− δt+1δt+2δt+3 · ·δT−1P (Y T−1)
i
,
where the terms in square brackets are all positive. Thus, the condition above will certainly
be respected when the first term is positive, that is, for
δtP (Y t)− (1 + δt)δt+1P (Y t+1) ≥ 0
which can be rewritten as
P (Y t)
P (Y t+1)
≥
³
δt+1 + δ2t+1
´
δt
= δ + δt+1. (18)
By assumption, P (Y t+1) is both decreasing and log-concave in Y t. Moreover, given that the
number of firms kt = 2(t−1), it follows that:h
kt+2 − kt+1
i
>
h
kt+1 − kt
i
for every t = 1, ..T , and this implies that
Y t+2 − Y t+1 > Y t+1 − Y t, (19)
again for every t = 1, ..T.
Condition (19) and the log-concavity of P (Y t) together imply that
P (Y T−2)
P (Y T−1)
≥ P (Y
T−3)
P (Y T−2)
≥ ... ≥ P (Y
t)
P (Y t+1)
≥ .. ≥ P (Y
1)
P (Y 2)
.
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Hence, if:
P (Y 1)
P (Y 2)
≥ δ + δ2, (20)
the equilibrium condition (18) will a fortiori hold for every t = 1, ...T . Condition (20) is
solved for
δ ≤
£
P (Y 2)2 + P (Y 1)4P (Y 2)
¤ 1
2 − P (Y 2)
2P (Y 2)
. (21)
Thus, for such a (positive) discount rate, at every time t = 1, ...T all informed players
prefer to deter the exit of their workers.
Proposition 1 provides suﬃcient conditions for the game to end at the first period and for
the initial informed player (the innovator) to receive part of the rent for the idea. Note that
in general the concavity of the inverse demand function makes the strategy of exit deterrence
relatively less interesting at the first period of the game, when second period market price
is very close to that of the first period: the loss in gross revenue by accommodating new
entrants is small and lower than the gain in wage reduction (which reflects all following
stage revenues). Therefore, with a concave demand, which reflects an initial slow decline
in the value of the invention, the game is more likely to terminate at latter stages. The
economic intuition is that when players are patient (δ ' 1) and the price for the good does
not fall much initially for the entry of new competitors, at the beginning of the product
life we should expect inventors easily allowing information leakages, and play deterrence
later. The role of log-concavity in the model is thus which to make the first period demand
variations a threshold for game deterrence: if exit deterrence is profitable at time 1, it will be
throughout the game. Moreover, the presence of a suﬃciently low discount factor, reflecting
the impatience of players, makes the first ”inventor” suﬃciently sensitive to the initial loss
of profit, thus making profitable to play exit-deterrence at the first period.
4 Examples and Discussion
To illustrate the main results of the paper, and in particular the role of both the shape of
the demand and the discount factor to give rise to diﬀerent SNE, we assume a simple market
inverse demand for the product equal to P (Y t) =
¡
a− Y t
¢β
, where a = 2(T−1) represents
market capacity. Let T = 5, so the market accommodates only kT = 24 = 16 firms, i.e.,
for t = 5, P (Y T ) = 0. Note that the demand is strictly concave (and then log-concave) for
0 < β < 1, log-concave for β = 1 (the usual linear case) and convex for β > 1.
Let us assume first, for simplicity, that β = δ = 1, so the basic assumptions of the
model hold. Reasoning backward, at time t = (T − 1) = 4, a number k4 = 8 of competing
12
firms have entered the market, each one composed of one informed and one uninformed
player. Since wT−1 = πT = 0, at time 4 every informed player will obtain a payoﬀ equal to
P (Y T−1)− wT−1 =
³
a− Y T−1
´
− 0 = (16− 8) = 8. Hence, at t = (T − 2) = 3, with only 4
active firms, informed players will pay a deterrence wage only if
P (Y 3)− w3 ≥ P (Y 4)−w4, (22)
where w3 = π4 = 8. Condition (22) does not hold, since
P (Y 3)−w3 = (16− 4)− 8 = 4 < P (Y 4)−w4 = 8.
So, at time 3, all informed players will let the market expand by paying a w3 = 0 to all
recruited workers. At time t = 2, with 2 firms in the market, we have, instead:
P (Y 2)− w2 = (16− 2)− 8 = 6 < 8.
where, as deterrence wage, we have applied w2 = π4. Also in this case, there is no interest
to deter the exit of the workers. Finally, at time t = 1,
P (Y 1)− w1 = (16− 1)− 8 = 7 < 8,
and the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is to pay a non deterrence wage
w = 0 to uninformed players at every stage, ending the game at stage t = 4. Note that by
log-concavity of P (Y t), the condition on inverse demand over time holds:
P (Y 3)
P (Y 4)
≥ P (Y
2)
P (Y 3)
≥ P (Y
1)
P (Y 2)
,
since
12
8
≥ 14
12
≥ 15
14
.
However, this is not enough: by proposition 1 (with δ = 1), for the game to end at the first
stage (full deterrence) we would need
P (Y 1)
P (Y 2)
≥ 2,
which does not hold for the demand of the example.
It is clear from this example that demand log-concavity plays a role in making the strategy
of exit deterrence relatively less interesting when the product is initially sold in the market.
As said above, with a log-concave (or concave) demand, the game is likely to terminate at
last stages.
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Let us now briefly see what happens if δ 6= 1 and the discount factor respects the constraint
of proposition 1. In our example, with β = 1,
δ ≤
£
P (Y 2)2 + P (Y 1)4P (Y 2)
¤ 1
2 − P (Y 2)
2P (Y 2)
=
p
142 + 4 (14) 15− 14
2 (14)
= .645.
Taking, for instance, δ = .5, we have:
P (Y 1)
P (Y 2)
=
15
14
≥ .5 + (.5)2 = .75,
and by proposition 1, the game will end at time 1. Thus, with a suﬃciently low discount
factor, all informed players are suﬃciently impatient so that playing an exit-deterrence strat-
egy at each period become a weakly dominant strategy, even in presence of a log-concave
demand.
On the other hand, a convex demand is more sensitive to quantity shifts at the initial
rather than the at the last stages of the game. However, in our model last stages are char-
acterized by a larger number of entrants, so the final result can be ambiguous. To illustrate
this point let the demand of our example be convex, by assuming β = 2 and, again δ = 1.
By looking backward at the informed players’ payoﬀs, we have:
π4 = P (Y 4)−w4 = P (Y 4)− π5 =
³
24 − 8
´2
− 0 = 64
π3 = P (Y 3)−w3 = P (Y 3)− π4 =
³
24 − 4
´2
− 64 = 80
π2 = P (Y 2)−w2 = P (Y 2)− π3 =
³
24 − 2
´2
− 80 = 126
π1 = P (Y 1)−w1 = P (Y 1)− π2 =
³
24 − 1
´2
− 126 = 99.
At stage 2 and 3 workers’ exit is conveniently deterred, but not at stage 1. So the game will
end at stage 2. Therefore, in general convexity makes things diﬃcult to predict in our setup,
except for the isoelastic case presented at the end of the section. On the one hand, demand
convexity makes price shifts hit dramatically at the initial rather than at the final stages of
commercialization of an invention. So we should expect more deterrence at the beginning
of production. However, since by assumption the number of firms grow exponentially over
periods, deterrence may become convenient also when the market is mature.
To conclude, let us illustrate a peculiar example which makes clear-cut the role of market
demand on the problem at stake. This is the case of isoelastic demand, with P (Y ) = AY −
1
²
where ² represents the (absolute value of) elasticity of demand. In this case it is easy to see
that, for δ = 1, at every stage:
P (Y t)
P (Y t+1)
=
A
¡
2t−1
¢− 1
²
A (2t)−
1
²
≥ 2⇔ ² ≤ 1.
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The way to interpret the condition is clear: when the demand is rigid, the market price falls
considerably with the rise of output (as due to the entry of new firms) making crucial to deter
the expansion of the market. For an elastic demand, the opposite holds: price is insensitive
and thus expanding the market is less costly than keeping all workers inside the firm.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has presented a simple dynamic setting to analyze the issue of knowledge trans-
mission within a firm first, between an inventor and her workers, and across firms after,
when workers’ mobility is not prevented with a compensation higher than a given reservation
wage. The model shows that, in absence of property rights, the value of an idea each period
depends on all future events, in which the market expands and new players become able to
sell the product. In this scenario, the crucial factors to shape the final market structure for
the product are the demand sensitivity over time, the time preferences of players and, of
course, the technology of production. In particular, this paper has constrained each informed
player to match at least another player to organize appropriately the production of the good.
However, diﬀerent technologies could generate diﬀerent results and the outcome would thus
depend on the intensity of demand eﬀect as compared to the eﬃciency eﬀect (wage saving
eﬀect and returns of scale of technology), both due to the expansion of the market. A more
detailed and deep analysis of this complex trade oﬀ will be matter for future research.
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